Greener Grass? An Analysis of Greenland’s Draft Constitutions and History of Greenlandic Home Rule Government

Introduction

In 2023, Greenland’s Constitutional Commission introduced its proposed constitution for Greenland (Commission’s draft) in preparation for the island territory to pursue independence from Denmark. After six years, the Commission’s final report contains a history of the Commission itself, the legal history of Greenland, and the Constitution and commentaries relating thereto. Since 2023, however, the independence process has progressed lethargically.  Only during the spring session in 2024 did Inatsisartut—Greenland's parliament—vote to charge Naalakkersuisut—Greenland’s executive—with creating another commission to prepare for activating the provisions of Danish law which trigger negotiations for Greenlandic independence. Following that vote, Greenland’s movement towards independence has come to greater international attention as United States President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to annex Greenland. However, the process still progresses slowly as the country now awaits the results of recently scheduled March elections, called by Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman in response to Trump’s threats and continued disagreements within the independence supporters.

Within Greenland, the Commission’s draft has been the subject of constant debate since its submission. A pro-independence party in Inatsisartut, Naleraq, has lambasted both the document and the process of its adoption. The party’s leader, Pele Broberg, has criticized the Constitutional Commission for consuming as much time and money as it did during the drafting process, going so far as to call the draft constitution a “stillborn child”. Additionally, Naleraq has substantively criticized the document itself claiming that the Commission’s draft is too specific despite that the Commission’s draft is already decidedly nonspecific vis-á-vis other constitutional texts, and if adopted would be one of the world’s shortest constitutions. Regardless, Naleraq introduced their own constitutional text in Inatsisartut to contrast the Commission’s draft’s supposed specificity. The party argues that a prospective constitution for Greenland should remain as broad as possible, leaving most issues for Inatsisartut to regulate through statutory law. The introduction to Naleraq’s draft states that, for example, the sections on Inatsisartut’s election and citizens’ rights, two of the topics removed by Naleraq, are “by nature better suited as laws, which they are for example today, and they do not belong in a constitution”. Yet why this focus on nonspecificity in the Greenlandic drafting process?

This article, drawing upon the limited scholarship on constitutional specificity and Greenland’s constitutional history, suggests that Greenland’s colonial status has heavily influenced the structure of Greenland’s legal system under self government by affecting both substance and structure of the law. This influence, by providing a longstanding, preexisting legal practice, led the drafts’ framers to construct such nonspecific constitutions, anomalous in comparison not only to other postcolonial constitutions but to constitutional documents at large.

Pincites to the Commission’s draft reference the section in the draft’s text, although the Danish text of that draft begins on page 49 of the Constitutional Commission’s report. Naleraq’s draft’s Danish text begins on page 3 of their proposal to Inatsisartut, and pincites thereto also cite to the section, not the page number.

Constitutional Specificity - Scope and Detail

University of Chicago law and economics Professor Tom Ginsburg’s paper on constitutional specificity most informs this article’s deployment of certain terms while illuminating colonialism’s enduring influence upon Greenland’s contemporary political culture and institutions. Professor Ginsburg’s conception of specificity invokes two distinct yet interrelated concepts: scope and detail. Scope addresses which political issues warrant constitutional consideration whereas detail refers to the thoroughness given to each consideration. Ginsburg notes, “One can have a constitution that regulates many dimensions of public life in a very abstract manner; conversely one can have a constitution that has a narrow scope but much detail”. The intersection of scope and detail—that is, the breadth and depth of constitutional documents—undergird this article’s analysis.

Research conducted by Professor Stefan Voigt revealed that former colonies tend to write longer constitutions, specifically former British and Spanish colonies. Professor Ginsburg made reference to this observation in his own paper and explained this phenomenon as resulting from former colonies lacking constitutional norms and an existing structure of government when declaring independence. The constitution must fill that gap, and doing so necessitates a highly verbose, specific document providing clear rules and procedures that other constitutions may not codify. Both Ginsburg and Voigt  also observed that constitutions have become increasingly specific, with constitutions from the 21st century having very wide scope and significant detail. However, Greenland’s draft constitutions deviate from these trends observed by Voigt and Ginsburg, being notably nonspecific. This article’s focus is on this discrepancy between Greenland’s draft constitutions and observed trends regarding other constitutions’ level of specificity.

A (Brief) History of Greenlandic Self-Government in Law

Given that most readers are likely unfamiliar with Greenlandic constitutional law, this section provides a brief overview of Greenland’s legal history, necessary as Greenland’s constitutional history contextualizes the anomalous nature of the draft constitutions.

Greenland is currently an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark (together with Denmark and the Faroe Islands), whose home rule originates from the Greenland Home Rule Act 1978 of the Danish Parliament (Lov om Grønlands hjemmestyre). Section 1(2) of the Home Rule Act creates the home rule institutions: a parliament and an executive. The nomenclature for the parliament has changed since the Act from the Landsting to Inatsisartut; likewise, the executive, from the Landsstyre to Naalakkersuisut. The Home Rule Act mandates that the unicameral Landsting have elections every four years, that the Landsting select the Landsstyre’s Chairman and constituent members, and that the Chairman apportions the executive’s responsibilities among the Landsstyre’s members (Home Rule Act, §§2(1) and 3). The remainder of the Home Rule Act devolves the legal authority to regulate in certain areas of domestic policy to the home rule authorities, yet they did not acquire any control over foreign policy. The Act also required that home rule authorities discuss any domestic proposals with the Danish government that may have substantially impacted the Realm’s foreign affairs before proceeding (Home Rule Act, §11.2).

The Danish parliament supplemented the Home Rule Act in 2009 with the Greenland Self Government Act (Lov om Grønlands selvstyret). The Act affirms Greenland’s right to self-determination by establishing a mechanism for pursuing independence from Denmark (Self Government Act, Ch. 8). Moreover, the Act expands Greenland’s domestic authority (Self Government Act, Ch. 2), and authorizes the home rule authorities to establish courts (Self Government Act, §1) and enter international agreements—both in areas relating exclusively to Greenland, and both Greenland and the Faroe Islands through negotiations with the Faroese (Self Government Act, §1, §11–12).

Under Section 2(2) of the Home Rule Act, the Landsting exercised its newfound authority by enacting Landsting’s Law on the Landsting and the Landsstyre (L3) in 1988. This act provided the structure of the home rule institutions outside of the handful of provisions contained in the Home Rule Act, containing the substance normally found in constitutional texts. Following the enactment of the Self Government Act in 2009, in 2010 Inatsisartut replaced the L3 with Inatsisartut’s Law on Inatsisartut and Naalakkersuisut (ILIN) which predicates Greenland’s contemporary constitutional structure. 

Three other contemporary statutes inform Greenland’s political processes in ways often delineated by a constitution and have at least some of their contents constitutionalized in the draft texts: Inatsisartut’s Law on Election to Inatsisartut (ILEI), Inatsisartut’s Law on Naalakkersuisut’s Members’ Responsibility (ILNMR), and Inatisartut’s Law on the Ombudsman for Inatsisartut (ILOI). The ILEI, enacted in 2017, replaces the pre-Self Government Act Landsting’s Law on Election to Greenland’s Landsting (L2E) and limns suffrage and the qualification requirements for membership in Inatsisartut. The 2021 ILMNR supplants Landsting’s Law on Landsting’s Members’ Responsibility and provides for juridical responsibility for Naalakkersuisut’s members, which the Danish constitution also supplies for Danish governments ministers (Constitution of the Danish Realm (Danmarks Riges Grundlov), §16). The ILOI replaces a 2009 Inatsisartut law and implements the ILIN’s prescription that Inatsisartut instate an ombudsman (ILIN, §20), providing for one selected by Inatsisartut with oversight authority over all parts of Greenlandic administration.

(For a more detailed history of Greenland and Greenlandic law since Danish colonization, see Commission’s draft, Ch. 1.2; Denmark-Greenland in the Twentieth Century; and The development of Greenland’s self-government and independence in the shadow of the unitary state).

Government by Statute – Home Rule Institutions Over Time

Yet what do the aforementioned statutes prescribe? Like with the subject of the previous section, most readers may not have knowledge on Greenland’s government’s current structure. That context is vital for understanding the draft constitutions now introduced in Greenland. Thus, this section answers the above question.

The structure of Greenlandic home rule institutions has remained more or less the same since the L3 and the Home Rule Act, though with some notable differences. Inatsisartut remains, as established under the Home Rule Act, a unicameral parliament whose membership is elected quadrennially (ILIN, §2.1; ILEI, §5.1, cf Home Rule Act, §2.1). The ILIN, ILEI, and L2E have prescribed Inatsisartut’s size since home rule’s introduction as 31 (ILIN, §2.1; ILEI, §5.1; L2E, §5). Both the ILIN and L3 require that Inatsisartut meet within 45 days of an election and that its eldest member presides over sittings until the body elects its Chairman  (ILIN, §7; L3, §1), as well as that all sessions, barring special circumstances, must be public (ILIN, §9.1; cf L3, §12). Furthermore, no member can or could be held liable for statements made in Inatsisartut without its consent, or be prosecuted for crimes without Inatsisartut’s consent unless that member is or was caught in the act (ILIN, §6; cf L3, §33).

The ILEI and L2E establish the eligibility requirements for members of Inatsisartut. To be eligible for membership, the ILEI and L2E both require that a person possess suffrage and have no conviction for a crime which in “general reputation (almindeligst omdømme)” makes that person unworthy for membership (ILEI, §4; L2E, §4). Suffrage has always required voters possess Danish citizenship, have achieved the age required to vote for the Danish parliament (i.e., 18), and have resided in Greenland for at least 6 months prior to the election or meet certain special circumstances allowing those nonresident at the time of the election to vote (ILEI, §§1–2; L2E, §§1–2). Naalakkersuisut’s members must also be eligible for membership in Inatsisartut, meaning they must be eligible voters and not have convictions for a disqualifying criminal offense (ILIN, §22.4 jo §4; L3, §7 jo §4).

Both Inatsisartut’s members  and Naalakkersuisut possess the power of legislative initiative under both the ILIN and L3 (ILIN, §13.1; L3, §22.1). After introduction, bills receive three readings and Inatsisartut then finally passes the bill (ILIN, §14; L3, §22.1). The L3 required Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman and the member whose area of responsibility the bill related to sign the bill before its promulgation (L3, §24.1). Naalakkersuisut could also postpone ratification until the law is re-passed in a subsequent legislative session (L3, §24.2). The ILIN slightly differs with regard to Naalakkersuisut’s role in the legislative process as only Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman—instead of both the Chairman and another member—needs to sign the bill, and the Chairman must do so within four weeks or defer the bill for reconsideration (ILIN, §30).

Greenland’s system has been a parliamentary one, though the exact nature of Naalakkersuisut has differed slightly between the L3 and the ILIN. Under the L3 and the ILIN, Inatsisartut elects Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman from among its number and approves the Chairman’s selection for other members of Naalakkersuisut (ILIN, §§22.2–22.3; L3, §§3.1–3.3). The L3 specifically prescribed the method of electing the Chairman; to win the Chairmanship, a member had to obtain an absolute majority of the votes. If no member attained an absolute majority on the first ballot, then a second ballot was held. If no member attained an absolute majority again, the top two vote-getters proceeded to a third ballot whereafter, if they tied, the Chairman was selected by lottery (L3, §2.1 jo §3.2). Thereafter, Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman proposed 2-6 other members Inatsisartut voted on jointly (L3, §§3.3–3.4). The ILIN, meanwhile, does not prescribe a manner for Inatsisartut to select the Chairman, nor limit Naalakkersuisut’s size. Neither statute requires members of Naalakkersuisut aside from the Chairman to also be members of Inatsisartut, though both require such members meet the qualifications for membership in Inatsisartut (ILIN, §22.4; L3, §7).

Unlike with Naalakkersuisut’s formation procedure, its operation and dismissal has remained mostly consistent since home rule’s introduction. Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman distributes responsibilities between members of Naalakkersuisut once elected (ILIN, §23.1; cf L3, §4.3). Additionally, Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman calls elections to Inatsisartut prior to the quadrennial deadline (ILIN, §26; cf L3, §5.7). Inatsisartut possesses the statutory authority to dismiss Naalakkersuisut (ILIN, §27; cf L3, §5.2) which, if exercised, empower Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman to immediately call snap elections. (ILIN, §28; cf L3, §5.5). However, the L3 and ILIN differ on whether Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman could call snap elections if Inatsisartut dismisses only one of its members; only the L3 explicitly stated the Chairman may under such circumstances (L3, §5.5). The ILIN, however, provides that dismissing Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman is akin to dismissing the entirety of Naalakkersuisut (ILIN, §27.2), meaning that should the Chairman ever be dismissed they may immediately call snap elections. Both the L3 and ILIN gave Inatsisartut the responsibility for legislating such responsibility, resulting most recently in the ILMNR (ILIN, §22.6; L3, §4.2).

The Draft Constitutions and the Past: A Comparative Perspective

Preserving continuity, both draft constitutions largely retain the institutional structure as found in the L3 and the Home Rule Act as amended by subsequent statute. However, both drafts are much less specific than the current statutory provisions. Naleraq’s draft is especially nonspecific, and places greater emphasis on preserving the existing statutory language as found in the ILIN.

Naleraq’s draft’s chapter on Inatsisartut differs from the existing statutory laws both in scope and detail, omitting almost all subject areas which the existing statutes address. In contrast, the Commission’s draft encompasses a similar scope to existing statute, yet possesses a lesser degree of detail. The very narrow scope of Naleraq’s draft results in the drafts only sharing two substantive provisions: that Inatsissartut possesses the island’s legislative authority is elected quadrennially, the status quo under all preceding statutes (Commission’s draft, §§23.1–23.2; Naleraq’s draft, §§12.1–12.2; cf ILIN, §§1–2; and Home Rule Act §§1.2 and 2.1); and prescribe similar qualifications for suffrage and Inatsisartut membership (Commission’s draft, §§25.1–25.2; Naleraq’s draft, §§13.1–13.2). Both drafts also share similarity where both lack detail; neither draft provides for Inatsisartut’s size, nor does either draft mandate how soon after an election Inatsisartut must meet or who presides until Inatsisartut elects its Chairman, all details contained in the ILIN and L3.

The scope of Naleraq’s draft does not encompass the legislative process, criminal immunity for Inatsisartut’s members, or the creation of a Greenlandic ombudsman. Contarily, the scope of the Commission’s draft ensnares all three of the subjects absent from Naleraq’s, giving each similar detail and content as found in the statutes. The draft enumerates the legislative process—furnishing the power of initiative, the three readings requirement, and the effect of Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman either signing or withholding their signature to the bill—with identical content as found in the ILIN and L3 (Commission’s draft, §§27.1–27.5; cf ILIN, §§13–14 and 30; and L3, §§22.1 and 24.1). However, it is unclear whether Naalakkersuisut as a body, or its members individually possess legislative initiative based on the Commission’s draft’s language. The Commission’s draft also provides for identical protection against prosecution for Inatsisartut’s members as the ILIN, using identical phrasing (Commission’s draft, §24; cf ILIN, §6). It also provides that Inatsisartut shall appoint an ombudsman, that they operate independent of either Naalakkersuisut or Inatsisartut, and that Inatsisartut may dismiss the ombudsman if it loses confidence in them, the same provision as the ILIN makes for an ombudsman (Commission’s draft, §28; cf ILIN, §20).

Both drafts outline the qualification requirements for Inatsisartut’s members and suffrage, and do so with the same language. Eligibility for membership in Inatsisartut requires one to have suffrage, which itself requires that a person be 18 years old and a Greenlandic citizen (Commission’s draft, §§25.1–25.2; Naleraq’s draft, §§13.1–13.2). Sections 3 and 4 of both drafts accord citizenship to all persons born to a Greenlandic citizen  (i.e., ius sanguinis), or who statute naturalizes (Commission’s draft, §3; Naleraq’s draft, §3). These rules reflect the ILEI’s and L2E’s suffrage and qualification requirements, however they no longer include a residence requirement, likely because current Greenlandic “citizenship” is instead composed of Danish citizens with permanent residence on the island. Based on the ILIN’s text, the residence requirement exists to delineate between Danish citizens elsewhere in the Danish realm and those residing in Greenland. With independence, Danish citizenship would no longer extend to Greenlanders, making a residence requirement superfluous. Some rhetoric within Greenland, including from Naleraq, indicates a more ethnonationalist bent regarding suffrage—such as Naleraq’s leader Pele Broberg suggesting only ethnic Inuit Greenlanders should have suffrage during any future independence referendum—though neither draft reflects such sentiments.

In their chapters on Naalakkersuisut, both drafts vaguely reflect the current content of statutory law, though with a much decreased scope and detail. Both provide that Inatsisartut elects Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman from among its own number, though Naleraq’s draft makes no other provision for Naalakkersuisut’s formation (Commission’s draft, §30.1; Naleraq’s draft, §15.1; cf ILIN, §22.2; and L3, §3.2). Also, neither prescribes a means of election as seen in the L3 (§§2.1 jo 3.2). The Commission’s draft does not contain much more detail than this, and deviates more from the ILIN than in its section on Inatsisartut. The only additional detail contained therein states that Inatsisartut selects Naalakkersuisut’s members; unlike under the ILIN, where the chairman indirectly decides the body’s size by choosing the number of members to nominate, the Chairman only determines the number of members (Commission’s draft, §30.2–30.3; cf ILIN, §22.3; and L3, §3.3). Also, the Commission’s draft makes provision for Naalakkersuisut’s members’ juridical responsibility (Commission’s draft, §31; cf ILIN, §22.6; and L3, §4.2).

Under Naleraq’s draft, no section specifies who selects Naalakkersuisut’s other members—Inatsisartut or Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman. Other members must be eligible for membership in Inatsisartut, though the draft does not outright specify whether they must be members thereof (Naleraq’s draft, §15.3; cf ILIN, §22.4; and L3, §7). The Commission’s draft contains no provision whatsoever on Naalakkersuisut’s members aside from the Chairman being a member of Inatsisartut (Commission’s draft, §30.1). Naleraq’s draft contains no section enumerating who apportions responsibilities between Naalakkersuisut’s members, nor providing for juridical responsibility for them should they commit maladministration or have involvement in some other offense. In short, Naleraq’s draft makes almost no provision at all for Naalakkersuisut’s formation and structure, omitting almost all scope and detail relating to Greenland’s executive.

The Commission’s draft simplifies the power of Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman to call snap elections vis-á-vis the ILIN. Whereas the ILIN only permitted snap elections when Inatsisartut dismissed the Naalakkersuisut’s as a whole or its Chairman, the Commission’s draft simply states that “Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman can announce elections to Inatsisartut (Formanden for Naalakkersuisut kan meddele valg til Inatsisartut)”, which the draft’s commentaries clarify means the Chairman may call elections at any time (Commission’s draft, §29.6 and pg. 94). Naleraq’s draft instead reproduces the ILIN’s section on the Chairman’s ability to call elections which states: “Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman is responsible for calling elections before the end of the electoral period (Formanden for Naalakkersuisut har ansvaret for udskrivelse af nyvalg, inden valgperiodens udløb)” (Naleraq’s draft, §12.4). Naleraq’s draft also adds that Inatsisartut may call elections via a majority vote. (Naleraq’s draft, §12.6).

This added power likely results from the Naleraq’s draft containing no language permitting the Chairman to call abnormal elections, even if dismissed as the ILIN does (ILIN, §28). Such language gives Inatsisartut a mechanism to force an election via compelling the ousted Chairman to call one, yet with the Chairman having no such authority in their draft, Naleraq would need to add another means for Inatsisartut to call an election, like giving Inatsisartut the right to call elections itself. The Commission’s draft instead resolves this conundrum by eliminating limitations on Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman’s ability to call elections completely, allowing the status quo dynamic found in the ILIN between Inatsisartut and Naalakkeruisut’s Chairman to persist.

Looking at length, Naleraq’s draft cuts down the chapters on Inatsisartut and Naalakkersuisut from 41 subsections in the Commission’s draft to 16. In the process, Naleraq’s draft removes all but the absolutely most basic rules outlining those institutions. The Commission’s draft, meanwhile, encompasses most of the same scope as encompassed by the ILIN and L3. The draft does contain slightly less detail, however, simplifying some aspects—such as Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman’s power to call elections—and simply removing others to leave instead for statutory law—such as Inatsisartut’s size.

Colonialism and Dominion Status vis-á-vis Greenland’s Legal Practice

As Voigt’s research suggests, constitutions of newly independent colonial states tend toward greater length. Accepting the reasonable assumption that length roughly correlates with specificity, analytical analysis suggests that Greenland’s draft constitutions should have a fairly significant degree of specificity. Yet, the opposite is true. Both constitutional drafts for Greenland, the Commission’s and Naleraq’s, instead possess a limited scope and substantially less detail vis-á-vis the statutes currently and historically framing Greenland’s institutions. Comparing the drafts to other currently-in-force constitutions, the same observation stands as the Commission’s draft, let alone Naleraq’s, as the draft is shorter than the world’s current shortest constitution, Monaco. Yet, Voigt’s research, given Greenland’s colonial status, should have greater length/specificity, not less. What could explain this phenomenon?

Greenland’s unique situation of having been self-governing for half a century prior to the drafting of these constitutions helps explain why Greenland’s draft constitutions are so nonspecific. The norms of government have already been established through home rule, first in the L3 and its connected statutes, and then in the ILIN and other Inatsisartut laws relating to Greenland’s governing institutions. This contrasts from Ginsburg’s explanation for the trend found in Voigt’s research that former colonial states’ constitutions draft such lengthy constitutions because the document must create a new constitutional order with new norms that should ideally persist. Instead, Greenland has had the time to evolve these norms and a constitutional order for over half a century since the introduction of home rule.

Greenland’s home rule does not fully explain the draft constitutions’ anomalous nonspecificity, though. The effect of possessing home rule together with the particular effect of being an autonomous territory in the Danish Realm provides a more thorough explanation. As a subject of the Danish Realm, Greenland has lacked its own constitution. Whereas the Home Rule Act and Self Government Act provided for Greenland’s basic constitutional framework, statutes—like the L3, the ILIN, the ILEI, and the ILNMR—have furnished the heart of its constitutional law. Reluctance to deviate from this flexible, longstanding practice amenable to modification further explains the draft constitutions’ nonspecificity. Naleraq’s draft exemplifies this reluctance: “It is important that if [Greenland is] to have a constitution, that it must be both easily understandable for the population and future-proof … For example, a number of paragraphs have been removed from the draft, which for example deal with elections to the Inatsisartut … They are by nature more suitable as laws, as they are for example today. And do not belong in a constitution” (emphasis added) (Naleraq’s draft; pg. 1).

The practice of framing the government in statute instead of a constitution originates in Greenland’s inability to have a constitution of its own due to its status as a dominion of the Danish Realm. Greenland’s territorial status and resulting reliance on statute, therefore, further accounts for the trend toward nonspecificity in the draft constitutions.

This analysis of the draft constitutions and their statutory antecedents also highlight the effect Danish law and Danish rule has had in Greenland, affecting not only the specificity of the draft constitutions but their substance. The Danish parliament, not a Greenlandic assembly, framed the most basic premises underpinning Greenland’s institutions—a quadrennially elected legislature (i.e., the Landsting and Inatsisartut) and an  (i.e., the Landsstyre and Naalakkersuisut) with responsibility to and reliance on the continued confidence of the legislature—in the Home Rule Act (Commission’s draft, §§23.1–23.2, 29.3, and 30.2; Naleraq’s draft, §§12.1–12.2 and 14.3; ILIN, §§1–2 and 22.1; ILEI, §6.1; L3, §5 jo L2E, §6). Yet these basic underpinnings persist into even the drafts for Greenland once independent, not only in substance but in the verbiage itself as the ILIN and both draft constitutions have used the same language as that of the Home Rule Act (cf Home Rule Act, §§2.1 and 3). The introduction and continued retention of juridical responsibility, not just political impeachment, for Naalakkersuisut also highlights the continued persistence of Danish law’s effect. Numerous other sections, especially those on human rights in Chapter 2 of the Commission’s draft, are mere reproductions of the Danish constitution. Danish law, adopted gradually through the soft influence of Denmark and its law on Greenland as its subject, has left an indelible mark on Greenlandic law and legal philosophy.

Conclusion - An (Un)Certain Future

Greenland has long occupied a status as an autonomous territory within the Danish Realm which permits Greenland its own institutions yet not its own constitution. That self-government, during which Greenland has not had its own constitution, a philosophy and practice which favors nonspecificity in constitutional texts and relying instead on statute has formed. The result of this history is the anomalous nonspecificity vis-á-vis other form colonies’ constitutions and other constitutions generally found in both draft constitutions, and in particular Naleraq’s draft for whom the goal of modifying the Commission’s draft was, in part, to ensure reliance on statute over a constitution (Naleraq’s draft; pg. 1). This analysis certainly shows, if nothing else, that colonialism will have left an indelible mark on Greenlandic law under these constitutions, which not even independence will be able to fully remove.

What will come of these constitutions and Greenlandic independence remains to be seen. Naalakkersuisut’s Chairman, Múte Bourup Egede has made clear that, despite President Trump’s statements, “Greenland is ours. We are not for sale and will never be for sale”, sentiments echoed by the Danish government. Greenland is recognized, both by Denmark in the Self-Government Act and potentially by international law, as possessing a right to self-determination (see The Right to National Self-Determination: The Faroe Islands and Greenland). Unless interfered with from the outside, it seems certain that Greenland will, sooner or later and under one of these constitutions or another, make good on that right. As Chairman Egede said at the opening of the European Commission’s new office in Nuuk, “It is now time for our country to take the next step. Like other countries in the world, we must work to remove the obstacles to cooperation—which we can describe as the shackles of colonialism—and move forward.”